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Original Research Article
Caution: Rumors ahead—A case study
on the debunking of false information
on Twitter
Anna-Katharina Jung1 , Bj€orn Ross2 and Stefan Stieglitz1
Abstract
As false information may spread rapidly on social media, a profound understanding of how it can be debunked is
required. This study offers empirical insights into the development of rumors after they are debunked, the various
user groups who are involved in the process, and their network structures. As crisis situations are highly sensitive to the
spread of rumors, Twitter posts from during the 2017 G20 summit are examined. Tweets regarding five rumors that
were debunked during this event were manually coded into the following categories: rumor, debunking message,
uncertainty about rumor, uncertainty about debunking message, and others. Our findings show that rumors which
are debunked early and vehemently by official sources are the most likely to be stopped. When individuals participate in
the process, they typically do so by sharing uncommented media content, as opposed to contributing user-generated
content. Depending on the conditions in which a rumor arises, different network structures can be found. Since some
rumors are easier for individuals to verify than others, our results have implications for the priorities of journalists and
official sources.
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Introduction
The veracity of information online has been intensively
debated. Ideological polarization and a decreasing trust
in traditional media catalyze the spread of false infor-
mation (Spohr, 2017). Not least the disinformation
campaigns during the US presidential elections sparked
an interest in the role of fake news (Vargo et al., 2018).
Since social media have become a key information
source for many people, examining their role in the
dissemination of false information is crucial (Nielsen
et al., 2019).
Social media platforms take different approaches to
this problem. Facebook’s current strategies are to
undermine the economic incentives and to develop
technical solutions to help users to make more
informed decisions, for example by showing warning
messages, relying on the work of fact-checking units
(Clegg, 2020; Ross et al., 2018). While Twitter has
always underlined that the company is not the “arbiter
of truth”, they recently introduced warning labels and
even delete harmful content (Crowell, 2017; Roth
and Pickles, 2020). Although platforms continuously
improve their measures against the spread of false
information, every individual user should also, to the
best of their ability and knowledge, reflect on the truth-
fulness of the information they encounter. However,
echo chambers in which alternative narratives spread,
fueled by selective exposure, can complicate the evalu-
ation of information (Spohr, 2017; Starbird, 2017).
When an imbalance arises between the demand for
information and the amount of factual information
available, rumors begin to spread (Oh et al., 2013).
Although rumoring is a typical human reaction to
make sense of an event, this moment of speculation
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leaves a lot of room for the spread of false rumors, or
even mis- and disinformation, which can be dangerous
(Mirbabaie and Marx, 2020).
A number of terms and concepts are used to describe
and theorize false information. Fake news, mis- and
disinformation, and rumors are the most prominent
examples. In this study, we use the term rumor, as it
is the broadest of these concepts. We understand
rumors as “unverified and instrumentally relevant
information statements in circulation that arise in the
context of ambiguity, danger or potential threat, and
that function to help people make sense and manage
risk” (Bordia and DiFonzo, 2007: 13). The term is
applied to a piece of information whose veracity at
the time of dissemination is unclear; the possibility
remains that it could turn out to be true (Spiro et al.,
2012).
The desire for facts is especially high in moments of
uncertainty and during opinion formation processes.
Thus, the identification and rebuttal of false rumors
is important for crisis management (Zeng et al.,
2016). Due to the high level of uncertainty and the
information need of the people involved, crisis situa-
tions are vulnerable to the spread of rumors (Oh et al.,
2013). Although rumoring itself is a necessary process,
the spread of false information can lead to panic reac-
tions and false accusations and it might even constrain
the work of emergency agencies (Abdullah et al., 2015).
Thus, the dissemination of false rumors can be a secu-
rity threat. Therefore, it is important that useful and
factual information is disseminated to distinguish false
from true rumors and to guide the collective sense-
making process (Simon et al., 2016).
As even the most sophisticated detection algorithms
will not entirely prevent the spread of false informa-
tion, a profound understanding of how it can be cor-
rected effectively is required. Only few studies have
investigated the development of rumors during and
after their rebuttal. Existing studies indicate that the
total number of debunking messages is lower than the
number of rumor-related messages, which implies a
lower total reach (Chua et al., 2016; Starbird et al.,
2014). Furthermore, the spread of rumors often con-
tinues even after they have been debunked, which is
referred to as the “echo effect” (Jong and Dückers,
2016: 340). The prolonged spread of false rumors,
after their correction, can be understood as a further
indicator of an ineffective debunking strategy. We
therefore address the following research question:
RQ1 How does the spread of rumors develop after they
are debunked?
A closer look at the users involved shows that the
amount of discussion between the spreaders of
rumors and corrections is limited (Bessi et al., 2015;
Starbird et al., 2014). This indicates that filter bubbles
can influence the effectiveness of debunking strategies.
Official sources have been identified as important
actors for rumor corrections, especially in crisis situa-
tions (Andrews et al., 2016). As official sources such as
media organizations or emergency agencies are often in
central network positions and enjoy a high level of
credibility, the role of individual users in the debunking
process has received less scientific attention. However,
in times of increasing media bias and in societies with
less press freedom, the influence of individuals can be
important (Haigh et al., 2018). Their impact should not
be underestimated. We therefore address the following
research question:
RQ2 How do individual users participate in rumoring
and debunking processes?
To find generalizable patterns linked to the diffusion of
rumors in social media, the network structures of five
rumors are compared. The diffusion patterns of
rumors on a network level are only sparsely researched
(Bagavathi and Krishnan, 2019; Garcia-Herranz et al.,
2014). The major focus of previous research often lies
with rumors, ignoring the important debunking mes-
sages. To find out if different rumor types entail differ-
ent network structures and thus might require different
debunking strategies, we address the following research
question:
RQ3 Which network structures can be found in rumor-
ing and debunking processes?
This article contributes to the literature a systematic
comparison of the debunking of five false rumors for
a political event in Germany, with a particular focus on
the role of individuals and on network structures.
736,577 Twitter posts about the Group of Twenty
(G20) summit in July 2017 in Hamburg were analyzed.
We find that the rumors that were debunked vehement-
ly and early were the most likely to be stopped. The
professional media and official sources such as the
police play a paramount role in this regard.
Individual users then forward their statements to fol-
lowers, which helps the debunking message spread. The
networks of the rumor spreaders and debunkers can be
distinguished into three distinct types, reflecting differ-
ent underlying community structures, for example
based on the users’ different political views. Our
work implies that journalists and authorities should
focus on rumors that are hard to verify for people with-
out privileged access to information. Rumors that are
easy to recognize as false to anyone who is on site are
more likely to self-correct.
2 Big Data & Society
Related work
False information on social media
The mechanisms of news broadcasting have changed
fundamentally in the past decades. Digital media
have altered our communication behavior (Newman
et al., 2016). The rapid flow of information in social
media facilitates the spread of fake news and unverified
information, both for commercial and for political pur-
poses (Chen et al., 2013). Virally spread false informa-
tion can lead to panic reactions during crisis situations
that cause economic and reputational damage (Chen
et al., 2013; Oh et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016).
There are numerous terms related to false informa-
tion in social media: conspiracy theories (Bessi, 2017),
false flags (Starbird, 2017), misinformation (Mazer
et al., 2015), disinformation (Gupta et al., 2014), fake
news (Rubin et al., 2015), satire (Cornwell et al., 2016),
and rumors (Kwon et al., 2013). Many of these terms
are used more or less interchangeably in academic lit-
erature, which underlines that their definitions are not
clearly delineated (Al-Mansour et al., 2014; Rubin
et al., 2015).
The most prominent concepts are mis- and disinfor-
mation, fake news, and rumors. We avoid the term fake
news due to its politicized nature, especially since the
2016U.S. presidential elections (Vosoughi et al., 2018).
Disinformation is “all forms of false, inaccurate, or
misleading information designed, presented and pro-
moted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit”
(HLEG on Fake News and Disinformation, 2018).
Misinformation does not imply intention (Hameleers
et al., 2020) and it is therefore very close in meaning
to rumors, but it is applied to information that is
known to be false and it is therefore more negatively
connotated. We decided to use the term rumors for this
case study as it does not imply a judgment about the
sender’s intention or the veracity of the presented
information.
Most approaches to identify rumors in social media
rely on identifying deceptive content. Automatic iden-
tification techniques use indicators such as linguistic
cues (Kwon et al., 2013), metadata about the sender
(e.g. friend–follower ratio or verification status of
Twitter accounts) and the presence of citations of exter-
nal sources to back up a claim (Castillo et al., 2012;
Gupta et al., 2014). As rumors especially arise in peri-
ods of high uncertainty, linguistic cues that indicate
uncertainty have been used as early warning systems
for rumors (Zhao et al., 2015). Another scientific aim
is the development of automatic approaches to identify
false information in real-time to prevent their diffusion.
Most real-time solutions take the form of browser plu-
gins, which warn the users about potentially false
information (Chakraborty et al., 2016; Gupta et al.,
2014). Although researchers have made progress in
such automatic detection and flagging of rumors, it is
unlikely that social media will ever be entirely free of
misinformation.
Debunking false information on social media
The term debunk was coined by Woodward (1923) as a
synonym for “take the bunk out of things”. Once a
false rumor spreads on social media, approaches are
needed to correct it and reach those who have seen,
liked or shared it. Jong and Dückers (2016) describe
three ways to correct false information on Twitter:
deleting the post, posting a correction, or directly con-
tacting the rumor spreaders via @-mentions. Only the
deletion of a tweet also deletes follow-up communica-
tion in the form of retweets. Copies of original rumor
posts, e.g., in the form of screenshots, are problematic
on Twitter and Facebook, as they can have an impact
on the persistence of false information (Friggeri et al.,
2014).
To understand the debunking process, it is essential
to study the messages and their authors. Journalists
and researchers are often thought to be responsible
for the identification and correction of false rumors
online (Berghel, 2017; Dale, 2017). While political
rumors allow journalists time to check and research,
rumors in crisis situations require a quick rebuttal to
prevent panic situations (Andrews et al., 2016).
Government organizations also need to intervene
quickly with correct information through multiple
channels, to prevent further damage (Oh et al., 2013).
Social media accounts of official bodies such as media
organizations, emergency agencies, or politicians have
a high reach. In moments of uncertainty, social media
users consult them, as they are considered reliable
(Andrews et al., 2016). In moments of information
scarcity, before official accounts are able to deliver
trustworthy information, social media users turn to
unofficial accounts (Oh et al., 2013; Shklovski et al.,
2008). Andrews et al. (2016), who investigated the role
of official accounts in the context of rumor propaga-
tion, showed that debunking messages posted by an
official account motivate other users to correct earlier
false information. According to Hunt et al. (2020),
most of the debunking tweets by individual users are
related to news agencies and government organiza-
tions. However, the findings also showed that messages
affirming the rumor received more attention than those
debunking it.
Journalists are thought to be in a position of great
responsibility concerning the containment and correc-
tion of rumors due to their professional ethics (Arif
et al., 2017). If they pick up breaking news from
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social media without verification, they can foster the
spread of rumors and strengthen their negative impact
due to their reach. Jong and Dückers (2016) hypothe-
size that the media and official sources influence the
rebuttal of rumors when this requires deeper investiga-
tions, such as getting in touch with officials, companies,
or institutions, as this fact-checking can hardly be done
without a press card or police ID. It needs to be
doubted that social media users can always accurately
identify trusted sources. Andrews et al. (2016) discov-
ered the great influence of “breaking news accounts” in
rumor propagation. These accounts imitate the layout
and communication patterns of trusted media outlets.
Although they were not real official sources, their
tweets were highly shared.
A frequently presented hypothesis is that the crowd
itself can detect, question, and even remove false infor-
mation (Heverin and Zach, 2012). This assumption is
linked to the concepts of collective intelligence and the
wisdom of the crowds (Surowiecki, 2005), but it needs to
be questioned. Studies show that misinformation on
social media outnumbers debunking messages (Chua
et al., 2016; Starbird et al., 2014). Although these findings
cannot reflect whether corrections were seen and under-
stood by many, they make it seem unlikely that effective
self-cleaning takes place. Even rumors which have
already been debunked are still shared, a notion known
as the “echo effect” (Andrews et al., 2016; Chua et al.,
2016; Jong and Dückers, 2016). In contrast to individu-
als, official sources are more cautious to share informa-
tion that is already obsolete (Jong and Dückers, 2016).
While the motivation to share rumors has been inves-
tigated, there are few studies about motivations to cor-
rect them. Oh et al. (2013) showed that source ambiguity,
personal involvement, and anxiety motivate users to
share rumors online. Their findings underlined that
source ambiguity plays less of a role on Twitter than it
does in offline contexts. In contrast to rumors, correc-
tions show a lower level of anxiety and emotions and are
often factual and unambiguous (Chua et al., 2016).
Regarding individual users, Arif et al. (2017) found
that most users who affirmed a rumor did not take
any corrective action because of continued uncertainty
about the rumor and the feeling that there was no need
to correct it. Additionally, Wang and Zhuang (2018)
investigated the misinformation and debunking response
of misinformed Twitter users, which supports the finding
of Arif et al. (2017) that misinformed Twitter users often
do not take any action after seeing a debunking message.
There has also been very limited research on the struc-
tures of the communities involved in sharing and debunk-
ing rumors. Social network analysis has become a widely
accepted tool (Stieglitz et al., 2018), yet its application to
rumor research is rare. There have been calls from schol-
ars to use more tools from social network analysis, for
example from the marketing literature, where the goal is
to understand the characteristics of negative word of
mouth (Pfeffer et al., 2014). In a recent study of online
rumors, networks were used to visualize the relative fre-
quencies of accurate and inaccurate tweets (Zubiaga
et al., 2016). Characteristics of the network are sometimes
leveraged to help improve the accuracy of rumor detec-
tion tools (Kwon et al., 2017; Zubiaga et al., 2018), but in
these studies, the networks themselves are not studied to




On 7 and 8 July 2017, the heads of state of the world’s
largest economies met in Hamburg to discuss the global
political situation at the G20 summit. Anti-
globalization movements criticized this, and especially
the demonstration “Welcome to Hell” on 6 July trig-
gered violence. This resulted in the use of water can-
nons and tear gas by the police, to prevent vandals
from torching cars and barricades or plundering
nearby shops. Various rumors spread on social
media. For this study, the five rumors were chosen
that received the greatest attention online and offline
and were debunked by credible sources while the event
was still ongoing, namely the Hamburg Police
Department and the fact-checking unit of the
Tagesschau, the most popular TV news broadcast in
Germany. This allows the analysis of the rumor and
debunking messages over time. The Tagesschau is pro-
duced by Germany’s public service broadcaster and it is
one of the most objective German news sources, as it is
neither state media nor a private TV station but
financed by the German citizens. According to the
Reuter’s Digital News Report 2019, Tagesschau is the
most trusted news brand in Germany (Nielsen et al.,
2019). The rumors concern five alleged events, namely
1. the use of army tanks by the police against the pro-
testers (tank),
2. a police officer being permanently blinded by a fire-
cracker (firecracker),
3. a police raid on the left-wing venue Rote Flora
(RoteFlora),
4. the user of nuclear weapons by the police to deter
the protesters (nuclear), and
5. the protesters attacking a hospital and emergency
room (hospital).
Since the focus of the study is on debunking, all the
selected rumors were false, and debunked while the
G20 summit was still underway.
4 Big Data & Society
Data collection
We focus on the microblogging service Twitter. In con-
trast to other social networks such as Facebook and
Instagram, communication on Twitter is almost entire-
ly public. The process of information diffusion on
Twitter can be traced by the analysis of original
tweets, retweets, commented retweets, replies, and
likes of tweets. The use of Twitter by official institu-
tions and media outlets to spread breaking news makes
it useful for research questions related to communica-
tion during events and crises (Stieglitz et al., 2017).
Tweets in German published between 5 and 10 July
2017 00:00 UTC were collected using the Twitter
Search API if they matched at least one of the follow-
ing predefined keywords: g20, nog20, g20-gipfel,
g20summit, welcometohell, blockg20, g20ham17. The
selection of keywords for the tracking of Twitter data
is an established approach. It leads to a reduction of
noise in the data set and facilitates data cleaning.
Neutral keywords (e.g. g20 or g20summit) were used
alongside those used by opponents of the summit
(nog20, welcometohell). The data set includes all
tweets of the accounts of the police department, the
fire brigade, and the city of Hamburg, as those
accounts are likely to be involved in debunking.
Qualitative identification of rumors and debunking
messages
Tweets related to the selected rumors were identified.
The total data set contains 736,577 tweets: 168,799
original tweets, the rest retweets. To identify the five
rumors, a list of keywords was used (see Table 1).
After identifying the related tweets, a codebook was
developed to categorize them (see Table 2). As rumors
often spread in moments of ambiguity, the categories
uncertainty about rumor and uncertainty about debunk-
ing message were added (Zeng et al., 2016; Zhao et al.,
2015). All codes are mutually exclusive.
To meet reliability standards, two independent
coders coded the data set, and Cohen’s Kappa (j)
was calculated. The overall interrater agreement for
the five rumors was 0.97, and between 0.92 for the
nuclear rumor and 0.99 for the hospital and firecracker
rumors. This level of reliability can be considered
almost perfect (Landis and Koch, 1977). When coders
one and two disagreed, a third coder was involved, and
the majority rule was applied. To be able to answer
RQ1, the development of the rumors and debunking
messages were analyzed over time. The peaks of
rumors and debunking messages were visualized and
the impact of the debunking message on the dissemi-
nation of the rumor evaluated.
Identification of account roles and debunking
message types
To analyze RQ2 and examine how various actors are
involved in debunking rumors, the communication
roles are classified. Mirbabaie et al. (2014) identified
five primary roles: emergency services agencies, media
organizations (including journalists and bloggers),
political groups and unions, individuals (politically
Table 1. Filtering keywords and selection criteria for tweets (translated into English from German).
Keywords Selection criteria
Tank rumor Tank, German
armed forces
Selected: tweets stating or denying that tanks were seen or mobilized in
Hamburg, that the German armed forces were in action, that a state of
emergency had been declared; pictures of tanks in connection with the event
Excluded: calls for the German armed forces to be deployed, reference to other
kinds of armored vehicles, e.g., the armored vehicles of the police
Firecracker rumor Blind, retina,
firecracker, neck
Selected: tweets stating or denying that a police officer had been permanently
blinded
Excluded: metaphorical usage of the word “blind”, such as the police being blind
to something
RoteFlora rumor Flora, raid Selected: tweets stating or denying that the police had raided the left-wing
venue Rote Flora
Excluded: tweets that merely asked for the venue to be raided by the police or
army
Nuclear rumor Nuclear missile,
rocket, bomb
Selected: tweets stating or denying that nuclear missiles were used in Hamburg
by the police
Excluded: tweets talking about an anti-nuclear treaty
Hospital rumor St. Georg, emergency
room, hospital
Selected: tweets stating or denying that left-wing extremists had attacked the
hospital of St. Georg
Excluded: tweets talking about police officers or protesters under medical
treatment
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engaged or personally involved), and commercial
organizations. For this study, the categorization was
slightly adapted. To improve the accuracy of the
results, the group media organizations only includes
official media accounts. Journalists and bloggers who
use their personal accounts are coded as the subcate-
gory journalist (personal). To only consider media
organizations would ignore the usage of Twitter by
journalists and bloggers in their free time, although
they post in a more professional manner than others.
The category of commercial organizations was dis-
missed, as it was not applicable.
To identify accounts by individuals, which were of
particular interest in this analysis, their verification
status was considered. Twitter verifies accounts of
public interest, such as those run by major news out-
lets, organizations, politicians, and celebrities. A badge
is displayed on these accounts’ Twitter pages.
Following these criteria, the roles of the 10 most
retweeted users spreading debunking messages and
rumors were determined. To ensure that the manual
coding process met reliability standards, two indepen-
dent coders coded the data set and Cohen’s kappa (j)
was calculated. Interrater agreement was 86.8%. In
cases of disagreement, a third coder was involved,
and the majority rule was applied.
Furthermore, we analyzed which rumor tweets were
deleted by the users or platform, to understand the
deletion patterns. This was done by a manual check
of the tweet ID after the final data collection. Finally,
the content of the debunking messages was examined
to identify debunking strategies.
Social network analysis
To examine the involvement of the different users, their
positions in the network and their influence on the
rumoring and debunking process (RQ3), the social net-
works formed by the participating users were visual-
ized. A retweet network was created for each rumor
from the tweets that mention the respective rumor. In
such a network, each Twitter account is a node. A
directed edge from node A to node B indicates that A
retweeted a tweet that was originally published by B.
The network was visualized with the open-source
software Gephi (Bastian et al., 2009). Nodes were col-
ored according to the type of messages that they had
spread regarding the rumor: red for accounts that
spread rumor messages, blue for debunking messages,
and white for users who had spread messages of both
types. For simplicity, nodes were not included if they
only spread tweets in one of the “uncertainty” catego-
ries or “other”. The size of the nodes corresponds to
their in-degree, that is, the number of accounts that
retweeted their tweets, as a measure of the influence
of an account. The algorithm Force Atlas 2 was used
to calculate the graph layout (Jacomy et al., 2014). In
this physics-inspired algorithm, nodes repulse each
Table 2. Coding scheme for rumor-related messages on Twitter (translated into English from German).
Category Description Code Example
Rumor message False information is forwarded. No
doubt is expressed.
1 The emergency room of a hospital has
been attacked, patients need to be
evacuated, reports NTV #schanze
#welcometohell #G20HH2017.
Debunking message A rumor is denied or a correction is
shared. The rumor is corrected in
the tweet itself or a linked article.
2 Again, for EVERYONE! There is no nuclear
missile in use at #G20.
Uncertainty about rumor The tweet shares the rumor, but ques-
tions it, possibly involving credible
sources such as the police or army
via @-mentions.
3 Are the #Germanarmedforces coming for
further reinforcement? (The police have
not confirmed that so far!)
Uncertainty about
debunking message
The tweet shares a message debunking
the rumor, but questions this mes-
sage, possibly involving credible
sources such as the police or army
via @-mentions.
4 G20 summit Hamburg: Military vehicles in
Hamburg—allegedly a parking problem.
Others Jokes, unclear statements, and opinions. 5 Why the left-wing extremist #RoteFlora is
not raided and shut down is something
that only the left-wing politicians and
judiciary understand.
6 Big Data & Society
other, and edges attract their nodes, creating a map in
which densely connected subgroups of users are close
together and sparsely connected groups far apart.
Results
Development of rumors and debunking messages
over time
A total of 6095 tweets were identified that are related to
one of the five rumors (Table 3). This number includes
both original tweets and retweets. The rumor with the
highest reach is the allegation that the police were plan-
ning to use nuclear weapons to deter the protesters
(rumor nuclear). Almost all tweets about this rumor
(95.1%) were coded as spreading the rumor, and very
few (1.7%) as debunking messages. The level of uncer-
tainty is low (2.4%). The most retweeted user for
rumor nuclear is the satire magazine “Der Postillon”,
which published this satirical news story. The tank
rumor is the subject of the second highest number of
tweets. Almost half (47.6%) of the tweets about it
spread the rumor and a third (33.1%) were debunking
messages. The tank rumor shows the highest level of
uncertainty: more than one in six tweets (17.8%)
express uncertainty about the rumor or debunking
message.
While there are more rumor messages than debunk-
ing messages about the tank and nuclear rumors, the
situation is the reverse for the firecracker, RoteFlora,
and hospital rumors. The firecracker rumor is the sub-
ject of almost twice as many debunking messages
(61.1%) as rumor messages (33.3%). Similarly, while
more than a third (37.6%) of tweets about the
RoteFlora rumor, the alleged raid on the left-wing
venue, help spread it, more than half (51.2%) contrib-
ute to debunking it. While more than 10% of the tweets
show uncertainty about the rumor, there is no uncer-
tainty about the debunking claims. The hospital rumor
shows the highest share of debunking messages
(88.4%). Less than one in ten (9.8%) spread the
rumor without at least expressing some uncertainty
about it.
The five selected rumors behave differently over
time (Figure 1). As typical for rumors in crisis situa-
tions, each rumor peaks and then quickly subsides. The
tank rumor shows a concentrated peak of rumor tweets
between 10 a.m. UTC and 12 a.m. UTC on 7 July. The
first debunking messages spread during the main rise of
the rumor at 11 a.m. and reach their peak at 12 a.m.
Most of the debunking messages are retweets of the
tweet by the police department. At 12 a.m., the dissem-
ination of the rumor and debunking messages starts to
decline, at 2 p.m. the rumor already drops to less than
50 tweets per hour. At midnight, the rumor fully loses
the users’ attention. Between its first appearance and
midnight, claims expressing uncertainty about the
rumor and debunking messages circulate. The satirical
nuclear rumor also peaks at 11 a.m. on 7 July, with 458
tweets per hour.
In contrast to the tank and nuclear rumor, the con-
versation around the firecracker, RoteFlora, and hospi-
tal rumors is dominated by debunking messages. The
firecracker rumor begins with a low but constant
spread of misinformation. On 8 July at 11 a.m., there
is a minimal rise in rumor messages up to 23 tweets per
hour. At around the same time, the first debunking
messages appear and are retweeted. This leads to a
drop in the number of rumor messages. The rumor is
last shared on 9 July at 12 a.m. On its peak on 8 July at
2 p.m., the retweet of the official rebuttal by the police
department and a tweet by the editor-in-chief of the
newspaper BILD Hamburg fuel the spread of debunk-
ing messages.
The RoteFlora and hospital rumors develop similar-
ly over time. The RoteFlora rumor peaks on 7 July at
7 p.m., due especially to retweets of comments by
active individuals who spread the rumor that the

















Rumor 840 279 181 2335 54
Debunking message 584 513 247 41 488
Uncertainty about rumor 154 43 51 52 10
Uncertainty about
debunking message
161 2 0 7 0
Other 27 2 3 21 0
Total 1766 839 482 2456 552
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left-wing venue Rote Flora had been raided. The
number of debunking messages rises simultaneously
with the rumor messages and peaks at midnight.
After this, the rumor quickly vanishes. The debunking
messages are mostly retweets of two left-wing groups.
The hospital rumor starts at 5 p.m. with tweets by two
unverified user accounts who share that a police offi-
cer they know had confirmed an attack on a hospital.
Quickly, the first debunking messages are shared by
the same left-wing group that was also involved in
debunking the RoteFlora rumor. On 7 July at 9 p.
m., the debunking messages peak, including official
debunking messages by the police department and
the public service broadcaster NDR. The spreading
of the rumor drops at the same time as the debunking
messages peak. At around 11 p.m. on 7 July, the
rumoring process is over.
Participation of individuals in debunking rumors
To understand how rumors can be debunked effective-
ly on social media, it is necessary to study the roles of
the users involved in the communication and the types
of messages they post to debunk rumors. Figure 2
shows the top users involved. It shows that the largest
group, both among the rumor spreaders and among the
Figure 1. Development of rumor messages, debunking messages, and uncertainty over time. 1: tank, 2: firecracker, 3: Rote Flora,
4: nuclear, 5: hospital rumor.
17 5 3 11 14
39 4 2 3 2
Debunkers
Rumor spreaders








Figure 2. The top 50 rumor spreaders (the 10 most retweeted rumor-spreading accounts for each rumor) and the top 50 debunkers
by type of account. Most of the most widely retweeted rumor spreaders were individual (unverified) users. Individuals also play a large
role in debunking the rumors, but so do (verified) professional journalists and media organizations.
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debunkers, is that of individual (unverified) users.
Almost four in five of the top 50 rumor spreaders are
individual users, as are almost two in five of the top
debunkers.
The involvement of individual users merits a closer
look at their debunking messages. The most common
type is the uncommented retweet of a rumor correction
by an official source. The most active such “official”
debunker is the Hamburg police department, with eight
debunking messages and 873 retweets. For the tank,
firecracker, nuclear, and hospital rumor, it is among
the top five most retweeted accounts. The media and
journalists are also highly represented in the group of
official debunkers.
In contrast to retweets of debunking tweets by others,
there are also original debunking tweets by individual
users. In the tweets by these users, three strategies can be
identified: sharing media content or official statements
by emergency services with one’s followers that deny a
rumor, addressing the rumor spreader directly by
@-mentioning them, or making an unsourced claim to
one’s followers that a rumor is false. Figure 3 shows how
common each of the strategies was for each of the five
rumors. Overall, the most popular strategy is to share a
link to a statement by the emergency services or profes-
sional journalists explaining that the rumor is false.
Finally, an approach that contributes to stopping
the rumor spread, although not to debunking it, is to
delete the tweet that contains the false claim. Of the
tweets about the tank rumor that were identified as
rumor messages (i.e. contributed to spreading it), 13
original tweets (13.2%) were deleted. Of the tweets
spreading the firecracker rumor, 33% were later
deleted. This is mainly linked to the suspension of a
highly active unverified user account, who wrote four
tweets that were shared by 82 individual users. Rumor
RoteFlora has a low deletion rate of rumor messages
(4.4%). They cannot be accessed any longer as the orig-
inal account is suspended. It is the same individual user
who was responsible for the most deletions of messages
spreading the firecracker rumor. The satirical nuclear
rumor has the lowest deletion rate (1.2%). Of the
tweets spreading the hospital rumor, 37% were later
deleted. The analysis of the users who deleted their
rumor tweets shows that only unverified accounts of
individuals used this approach.
Rumor and debunking networks
Finally, we examine the network structures that
shape rumoring and debunking processes. The
network visualizations (Figure 4) reveal that different
rumors can have vastly different community structures.
They can be roughly classified into three categories:
mixed networks, polarized networks, and one-sided
networks.
The mixed networks of the tank and firecracker
rumors are characterized by a relatively high number
of ties between those sharing rumor-related messages
and those sharing debunking messages. This indicates
that the same Twitter profiles that helped spread the
rumor also retweeted messages by the Twitter profiles
that helped contain or debunk it. This can be under-
lined, for example, by the account of the Hamburg
police, which posted the most relevant debunking mes-
sage, but also posted a tweet that contributed to the





















Figure 3. The strategies used by individual users to debunk the five rumors, excluding uncommented retweets. 1: tank, 2: fire-
cracker, 3: Rote Flora, 4: nuclear, 5: hospital rumor. The figure includes all original debunking tweets by unverified accounts (n¼ 178).
The lengths of the bars indicate the relative share of the strategy, while the numbers indicate the absolute number of tweets. The
most popular strategy was to link to an official source disputing the rumor’s veracity, such as an emergency service or a media
organization. However, in the RoteFlora rumor, claims of the rumor being false were more likely to be made without providing a
source.
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accounts for the tank rumor is the individual unverified
user who first shared the picture of the tank. This orig-
inal post was heavily retweeted and thus this user has a
central position among the rumor spreaders. This user
can be found in the top right corner of the network
visualization.
For RoteFlora, the situation is very different. The
network is polarized. The force-directed drawing algo-
rithm, which is based on the ties between the nodes,
reveals two separate groups. There are far fewer ties
between these groups than within each group. Of
course, since critics of the G20 summit are left-wing
activists, the entire discussion is political in nature, so
some degree of polarization is to be expected. Yet,
the difference between the two groups is much more
pronounced than for the other rumors, suggesting
that something else is at play here. We therefore
inspected the network more closely. Most users in
the smaller group, which consists entirely of rumor
sharers, are far-right activists who expressed their
enthusiasm at the news that the left-wing venue was
being raided, with one user even calling for it to be
set on fire.1 Those in the larger group, which
mostly consists of debunkers, are generally left-wing
activists. There are only a few rumor sharers in this
larger group, and they are also left-wing activists,
such as one who, having heard of the impending raid,
called for other protesters to meet at the venue.2 Only
few accounts link the two groups, because their
debunking messages are retweeted by members of
both groups. The one with the highest degree is the
news station n-tv.
Finally, the nuclear and hospital rumors are exam-
ples of one-sided situations in which the number of
those involved in spreading the rumor, or debunking
it, respectively, is far greater than the number of
accounts involved in the opposite activity, so that
they dominate the network. For the nuclear rumor,
“Der Postillon”, the website that posted the satirical
article about the alleged use of nuclear weapons by
the police, is clearly visible in a very central role. The
Hamburg police account is the most central one for the
hospital rumor, as it posted the most retweeted tweet, a
debunking message.
Discussion
This study offers insights into the spread and debunk-
ing of rumors on social media, in particular in the
German Twittersphere. Our results should be inter-
preted in light of the fact that the study was conducted
in a country where Twitter ranks among the five most
important social networks but has a smaller and older
user base than, for example, in the United States
(Nielsen et al., 2019), and where trust in the news
sector is much higher (Newman et al., 2016). The con-
tribution of this article to the literature is the systematic
comparison of the debunking of different rumors in the
context of one political crisis event, with a particular
focus on the role of individuals. Although the rumors
took place over the same time span, they each behaved
quite differently from one another. In the following, we
highlight and discuss key differences that help explain
why some of them were debunked more effectively
than others.
The G20 data sets reveals unexpected patterns
regarding the distribution of rumor messages, debunk-
ing messages and the levels of uncertainty: for three out
of the five rumors, there were more debunking than
rumor messages. This contrasts with previous findings,
Figure 4. Networks of rumor sharers (red), debunkers (blue), and those who spread messages of both types (white). The force-
directed drawing algorithm causes structural communities to form visible clusters (Jacomy et al., 2014). In the mixed networks 1 and
2, rumor sharers and debunkers are highly interconnected. The network for the RoteFlora rumor is polarized. The nuclear and hospital
rumors are examples of one-sided networks, where individuals from the minority group hardly play a role.
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where Twitter rumor messages outnumbered debunk-
ing messages (Chua et al., 2016; Starbird et al., 2014).
Wang and Zhuang (2018) who analyzed rumor and
debunking responses on Twitter for four rumors
during Hurricane Sandy and the Boston Marathon
bombing only identified one rumor which resulted in
more debunking than rumor-related tweets. They
hypothesized that the respective rumor was easier to
debunk; however, they did not offer an explanation.
Our result that for three out of five rumors there
were more debunking than rumor messages underlines
that there are different types of rumors, which differ in
how hard they are to debunk.
The development of the rumor and debunking mes-
sages over time underlines that the reach of rumors in
crisis situations depends greatly on temporal factors.
This situation is very different from political rumors,
which are more persistent (Abdullah et al., 2015).
Although that might lead to the conclusion that the
influence of rumor messages is limited, it needs to be
stressed how dangerous the spread of false information
in crisis situations can be. In this case study, for exam-
ple, the spread of the firecracker rumor was linked to
public calls to find the protester who threw the fire-
crackers that allegedly permanently blinded a police
officer. In the middle of a heated protest, this situation
can quickly become dangerous.
In the satirical news story alleging that the police
were planning to use nuclear weapon, rumor tweets
far outnumbered debunking messages. Only very few
rumor tweets were later deleted. The results indicate
that the Twitter community considered the rumor so
absurd that they did not think it was necessary to
debunk it. It can hardly be said that the satirical
story was mistaken for real news, as Cornwell et al.
(2016) anticipated. A self-correcting mechanism could
be observed, as expected by Jong and Dückers (2016).
In debunking the firecracker rumor, an article by the
newspaper BILD played a crucial role. However, some
of the rumor tweets also refer to the same article.
Although BILD later removed the incorrect claim
from the article, they did not publish a separate tweet
to inform users of the change. Therefore, it needs to be
assumed that the users who shared the first version of
the article did not realize that it was later corrected.
While journalists should correct information publicly,
as they greatly influence opinion formation, this ethical
requirement collides with their fear of reputational
damage. We argue that a tightening of journalism
ethics and legal requirements might counteract this
immoral behavior. However, a study on the US
media landscape revealed that partisan media are
highly involved in the production and spread of fake
news, which is why not all media outlets might be inter-
ested in correcting false rumors (Vargo et al., 2018).
Therefore, it might be interesting for platform pro-
viders to develop technical measures which identify
and indicate updates to hyperlinked articles directly.
The behavior of BILD in our case study complements
the findings of Zubiaga et al. (2016), who observed that
news organizations tend to use sources as an evidence
in their tweets, but sometimes do not verify those sour-
ces and consequently contribute to the spread of
rumors.
This paper provides results on which rumors
are likely to be debunked early and effectively. Like
Zubiaga et al. (2016), we recorded the greatest atten-
tion for rumors in their unverified stage. Especially the
RoteFlora and hospital rumor show that the more vehe-
mently and the more quickly rumors are rebutted, the
more successfully they are contained. This confirms the
findings by Oh et al. (2013) and Andrews et al. (2016).
Additionally, the rumors circulating in the morning
(tank and nuclear rumor) show a greater total reach
than those spreading in the evening or at night
(RoteFlora and hospital), which might be linked to
the users’ overall activity level. Moreover, the analysis
shows that the rumor that was nearly impossible for
individual Twitter users to disprove (the tank rumor,
which would require them to contact the armed forces),
showed the highest level of uncertainty and a low share
of debunking messages. In contrast, the RoteFlora and
hospital rumors, which could be disproved by anyone
on site, were debunked quickly. The influence of users
on site could also explain the quick resolution of one
rumor in the case study of Wang and Zhuang (2018),
for which they did not have an explanation. We con-
clude that timely and vehement debunking messages,
not only by official sources, but also by users on site,
are the most likely to stop the rumoring successfully.
The more difficult it is for individuals to disprove a
message, the higher the level of uncertainty and
the greater the responsibility of official sources to
debunk it.
This case study shows that although individual users
form the biggest group of rumor spreaders (78% of the
top 50), they also make up a third of the 50 top
retweeted debunkers, which shows that they are very
influential in this regard. However, as already shown in
prior studies, the role of official accounts on debunking
was high. The Hamburg police department was among
the most retweeted debunkers for four of the five
rumors, which clearly underlines that police depart-
ments need to train staff on how to detect and
debunk rumors in social media. To be able to react
promptly and determinedly to online rumors, debunk-
ing guidelines need to be developed that consider the
different types of rumors. While our findings suggest
that satire only requires a rebuttal if it is misinterpreted
by many users, especially those rumors which are hard
Jung et al. 11
to verify by the individuals should be quickly rebutted
by the police. The impact of government accounts in
debunking could also be found in the study of Hunt
et al. (2020), who conducted a case study on the use of
Twitter during two Hurricanes in the United States.
The fact that the original debunking messages by the
users mainly contain media content underlines that the
media bear a great responsibility in debunking rumors,
too. Although it is important that official sources are
distributing facts during a crisis to debunk false
rumors, this ideal has not been globally reached. The
freedom of the press is at risk in many countries around
the world and even in democratic societies, political
leaders contribute to the spread of false information
(Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Reporters Without
Borders, 2020). Especially in those societies, individual
debunkers and independent fact-checking institutions
are important (Haigh et al., 2018).
Looking at the users’ debunking behavior (RQ2),
the main type of debunking message is the uncom-
mented retweet of a tweet by an official or a profes-
sional journalistic source. Even when individual users
write original tweets, these tweets are dominated by
media content. This again underlines the importance
and social responsibility of media institutions and offi-
cial bodies. Both should be aware that they are in a
position from which rumors can be effectively cor-
rected. Only the RoteFlora rumor, which can be con-
sidered relatively easy to debunk by anyone who is on
site, contains more unsourced claims that the rumor is
untrue than media content. The hospital rumor shows a
balanced picture, while in the tank rumor, which is
more difficult to debunk, almost four in five debunking
messages by individuals cite media content. A rarely
used strategy to debunk rumors is to address the
rumor spreader directly using an @-mention. The find-
ings suggest that users hesitate to directly contradict
others, and instead prefer to aim debunking statements
at their own followers. This adds to the finding of
Wang and Zhuang (2018) who also found that conver-
sational debunking in the form of replies was a rarely
used debunking method. To analyze the characteristics
of a rumor and the level of difficulty to debunk it with
the different debunking methods of individual users is a
contribution of this case study.
Deleting rumor-related tweets is another approach
to debunking rumors. In this study, it was only used by
individuals. Yet, verified institutional Twitter accounts
are also less likely than individuals to spread rumors in
the first place, which makes the deletion of tweets less
necessary. These results add to findings (Jong and
Dückers, 2016) that official accounts are less prone to
continue spreading rumors after they are debunked.
The findings about rumor deletions show that the sus-
pension of users by Twitter effectively reduces the
number of rumor-related tweets. Thus, in the case of
illegal behavior such as calls for violence, reporting the
perpetrators can have a great impact, especially when
the rumor spreaders have a high reach (see firecracker
and RoteFlora rumors). Since the tank, firecracker and
hospital rumors show a deletion rate higher than the
average deletion rate of 11% (Bhattacharya and
Ganguly, 2016), it can be assumed that tweet deletion
is likely during and after the rumoring process.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining
the networks of rumor sharers and debunkers (RQ3).
In two of the networks, the users were mixed together
in one large group. In another rumor network, however
(RoteFlora rumor), the network is much more polar-
ized. The final two rumor networks are very one-sided.
The one-sidedness of these networks clearly mirrors the
fact that the messages of one type were much more
frequent than the messages of the other type. This com-
munity structure is a logical consequence of the num-
bers (see Table 3). In contrast, the difference between
the tank and firecracker rumors and the RoteFlora
rumor is not due to any difference in numbers. This
phenomenon was only brought to light by the network
analysis. In the RoteFlora rumor, the community struc-
ture mirrored the political views of the Twitter users.
Those on the political right spread the rumor, those on
the left the debunking messages. The most important
connection between them was a news organization that
spread a debunking message, once again highlighting
the paramount role of professional journalism.
However, this network structure might be an indicator
of ideological echo chambers and a selective exposure
of the users, who are only connected through few
bridging accounts, as described by Spohr (2017).
Only few previous studies have compared the retweet
networks for the spread and debunking of multiple
rumors. Zubiaga et al. (2016)’s approach has similari-
ties to ours, although the circular layout chosen there
does not allow an interpretation of the position of the
nodes. The force-directed layout algorithm chosen in
this work is suitable for clearly separating communities
from one another if they have few connections in
common.
It is still unclear why the RoteFlora network is so
much more polarized than the networks for the tank
and firecracker rumors. This result raises follow-up
questions that should be addressed properly in separate
studies: Which factors determine the emergence of
mixed and polarized networks? How frequent are
each of these network structures? Are rumors easier
to debunk in networks with more interaction between
the groups? The present findings show that network
analysis is a viable tool that should be used in future
research on the debunking of rumors.
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This study has some limitations. The Twitter data
set about the G20 summit only includes tweets which
contained at least one of the selected keywords. The
selection of five rumors can only give a limited over-
view about the rumors which circulated during the G20
summit. Furthermore, the manual coding of such data
sets is never free from the coders’ subjective interpreta-
tions, and sometimes ambiguous. As an example, a
newspaper article that had at first helped spread the
firecracker rumor was later corrected, so that those
subsequently spreading it contributed to debunking
the rumor without necessarily being aware of that.
Through the analysis, it has emerged that one of the
key characteristics that distinguishes rumors that are
debunked quickly from those that are not is the diffi-
culty for individual users to research their veracity,
without the privileged access to information that jour-
nalists and government agencies have. In the future,
similar studies should be conducted in a different appli-
cation area to test if this finding can be transferred to
debunking in other contexts.
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